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REFORMING THE COMPOSITION OF THE 
ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL IN VIEW OF ENLARGEMENT: 
AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED! 
DANIEL GROS
* 
Introduction 
It is widely accepted that enlargement requires reform of the highest decision-making bodies 
of the European Central Bank (ECB). In particular, there are concerns that the Governing 
Council, which is composed of the six-member Executive Board of the ECB plus the 
governors of the participating national central banks (NCBs), will grow too large to work 
efficiently. In the absence of reform, it could end up having over 30 members – resembling 
more a mini-parliament than a decision-making body that has to manage a global currency in 
fast-moving financial markets. Moreover, the accession of a number of small countries is 
often perceived as a threat to the “power balance” in the Governing Council.  
The official proposal acknowledges the first problem of “numbers and efficiency”, but it 
completely fails to offer a reasonable solution. It is apparent that the proposal was designed to 
address the second concern, i.e. the disproportionate representation of small countries. The 
proposed rotation in groups, however, is worse than the status quo. It is inefficient, opaque, 
internally inconsistent and arbitrary. Fortunately, it is not too late to stop it. The European 
Parliament has already expressed its opposition and the official proposal still has to be ratified 
by all member states before it enters into force. As the Convention on the Future of Europe is 
about to draft a new Treaty, a Constitution for the EU, there is still hope that alternatives can 
be considered. 
1. The  official  proposal 
Recognising that a Governing Council of over 30 members would be unwieldy, the European 
Council of Nice agreed on a simplified procedure to make some changes in the membership 
of the ECB governing bodies and asked the ECB to make a concrete proposal of how to 
change one paragraph in its statutes. This seems to have set in motion an acrimonious 
discussion within the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), that policy-making 
constellation comprising the ECB and the NCBs of eurozone members and about which very 
little is known outside central banking circles. At very last minute, i.e. in late 2002, the ECB 
came up with a proposal that had been elaborated in the strictest secrecy. 
The essence of the official proposal is to divide all euro-area member countries into three 
groups measured by economic size, which, in turn, is determined by a new composite 
indicator: 5/6 GDP and 1/6 ‘aggregate balance of the monetary and financial institutions’. 
Each group would have only a limited number of votes, which would in practise mean that 
countries would have to rotate: 
•  Group 1: 4 votes (5 members, so voting frequency is 80%) 
•  Group 2: 8 votes (number of members varies, so voting frequency falls as the euro area 
expands, the maximum is 8/11 or 72.27%) 
•  Group 3: 3 votes (voting frequency falls as the euro area expands, the maximum is 50%) 
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Which countries would be in which groups? Table 1 gives a possible distribution for three 
different hypotheses about the membership of the euro area. 
One of the reasons why it was felt that enlargement required a change in the composition of 
the decision-making organs of the ECB was that it is widely assumed that enlargement would 
increase the discrepancy between the relative economic and political weights within the 
Governing Council of the ECB. Most of the present candidates are relatively small in 
economic terms, but their representatives (the governors of the NCBs are often perceived that 
way) would have the same weight as that of Germany, whose economy is an order of 
magnitude larger. 
Can this perception be quantified and verified? Economic weights could be defined as GDP 
shares and the political weights could be defined as being equal for all countries to 1/n, with 
the number of countries in EMU. Using this definition it is not evident that the discrepancies 
that exist at present will be worse in a larger EMU. Indeed, if one takes as a measure of 
discrepancies the sum of the squared differences between the economic and political weights, 
one arrives at the opposite result: the discrepancies between economic and political weights 
are lower in a larger euro area than in the current euro-12 club. Table 2 below provides the 
results of some illustrative calculations. It is apparent that all larger euro area compositions 
considered here actually lead to a lower discrepancy between economic and political weights 
than the current euro-12 grouping. (See the Annex 3 to The Euro at 25, Special Report of the 
CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group, Gros et al., December 2002 for further details and 
additional calculations that take into account the Executive Board.) 
 
Table 1. Distribution of countries into groups  
  Euro-28 Euro-25   
(Euro-28 without BG, RO 
and TUR)  
Euro-22 
(Euro-25 without UK, 
SW and DK) 
G
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  Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
The Netherlands 
G
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p
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The Netherlands 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Poland 
Portugal 
Turkey 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Poland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
 
Belgium 
Austria 
Ireland 
Poland 
Portugal 
Greece 
Luxembourg 
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Slovak Republic 
  R EFORMING THE COMPOSITION OF THE ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL 
 3 
G
r
o
u
p
 
3
 
Romania 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Bulgaria 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Malta 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Malta 
Slovenia 
Lithuania 
Cyprus 
Latvia 
Estonia 
Malta 
Notes: Based on 2002 data. Due to limited availability of the data on the aggregate balance sheets of the 
monetary and financial institutions in the candidate countries the ordering is only approximate. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 2. Mismatch between economic and political weights 
  Three alternative economic weights: 
 GDP  Population  ECB  shares 
Euro-12 9.5  10.3  8.9 
Euro-15 7.4  7.8  7.1 
Euro-25 7.0  9.2  5.4 
Euro-27 7.2  9.4  5.7 
Euro-25-UK 8.0  10.8  6.1 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: Each entry represents the sum of the squared differences (times 100) between the political weights 
(defined as 1/n) and one of the different economic weights used here: GDP, population and ECB shares 
(the average of GDP and population weights). 
 
2.  A critique of the official proposal 
The proposal of the ECB seems to combine the worst aspects of all approaches one might 
consider. 
1.  It gives up the principle of equality of member states,
1 thus potentially undermining 
the idea that all members of Governing Council should forget the particular interests 
of their home country and act only in the interest of the entire euro area. 
2.  It does not achieve a significant gain in efficiency: 21 members is much too large for 
the Governing Council. No modern central bank has a decision-making body this size. 
In Germany the composition of the decision-making body of the Bundesbank was 
reformed because it was considered that any number above 20 would be much too 
high.  
3.  Moreover, all members of the Governing Council (with and without voting power) 
will continue to sit at the table and have the right to participate in the discussion. The 
ECB’s proposal thus does not solve the problem of the excessive size of the forum. 
4.  It is not even fully elaborated: The proposal does not say what is meant by ‘sharing’ a 
certain number of votes. By rotation? For example, it is not clear how the first group 
of five countries will share four votes. Will they rotate every meeting, every month, 
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every year? By what order? Or will there be no rotation and they agree among 
themselves on how to vote together? What happens to new members of the euro area?  
5.  It is internally inconsistent:
2 The aim is to ensure better representation of the larger 
countries, but this will not be achieved if the rotation principle is applied immediately 
once euro area membership reaches 15.  
6.  Because of this internal inconsistency that needs to be addressed, it is not even clear 
when rotation will start because the ECB reserves for itself the right to postpone the 
rotation system until there are more than 18 members of the eurozone and hence 24 
members of the Governing Council. 
7.  It is not transparent because it is too complicated. 
8.  It has arbitrary elements. The weight given to the indicator of the size of financial 
markets (1/6) is not justified in any way and seems designed to ensure a better position 
of one country (Luxembourg). Our calculations suggest that Luxembourg will have a 
larger weight than Finland (a country with about 10 times the population and 6 times 
the GDP). Table 1 above shows that notwithstanding the size of the euro area, the 
third group with the lowest voting power would consist exclusively of the new 
members. Was this the reason for the choice of the weight given to the indicator of 
financial markets? Why were the shares in the ECB not chosen as the measure of size? 
9.  It does not anticipate an even larger membership that should be considered as at least 
potentially imaginable given the candidacy of Turkey (and soon Croatia). As long as 
the UK does not join the euro zone, the group of the “big 5” will include the 
Netherlands (but not Poland). 
For all these reasons the ECB proposal should be blocked. Almost any of the existing 
proposals would have been better. The Commission should prepare an alternative and the 
Council should be urged not to adopt the ECB proposal. 
3. An  alternative 
The problem of the size of the Governing Council of the ECB is real. How should it be 
solved? The approach proposed here (see The Euro at 25, op. cit.) is quite simple: do not 
change the composition of the Governing Council, but ensure that it meets less often and thus 
re-define the division of labour between it and the other governing body of the ECB, the 
Executive Board, which has six members, including the President and Vice President. The 
tasks of the Governing Council should be to set the direction for monetary policy, decide on 
proposals from the Executive Board, constitute a platform for the exchange of views on the 
eurozone economy and monitor the work of the Executive Board. These tasks can be 
performed efficiently even by a rather large body and the representation of all member 
countries in the Governing Council provides the appropriate legitimacy for such a controlling 
function. The Executive Board should equally develop into a decision-making body in its own 
right, but so far its actions have been tightly controlled by the Governing Council.  
The Governing Council can be regarded as the “sovereign institution” in European monetary 
policy. It derives its sovereignty from the fact that it represents all the member states and 
pools expert knowledge from the national central banks. All powers within the ESCB can 
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eventually be traced back to the Governing Council. This also applies to the Executive Board, 
all of whose powers at present are directly delegated by the Governing Council.  
This proposal does not affect the primacy of the Governing Council – all powers would 
continue to emanate from it. It does, however, reduce the right of the Governing Council to 
control every single act of the Executive Board. Thus the Executive Board could come to 
enjoy a certain degree of discretion, which is justified by the fact that it represents not just the 
aggregation of individual state interests but rather a “general European monetary interest”. 
The division of labour proposed here is based on one key difference between NCB presidents 
and members of the Executive Board that is “objective”: i.e. their respective information 
bases. Board members concentrate on area-wide aggregates in their daily work and are likely 
to be in closer contact with global financial markets than the NCB presidents. The latter 
perform a wide variety of functions at the national level: they supervise the national banking 
system and are influential participants in national debates about almost all economic policy 
issues. By contrast, the remit of the members of the Board is more focused and narrowly 
defined, allowing them to concentrate almost exclusively on issues related to the formulation 
of the common monetary policy stance.  
This information advantage of the Board members is likely to be most pronounced in the area 
of financial market developments. Area-wide data on real economic variables, such as output, 
result essentially from the summation of national data that become available at different 
points in time and most of which contain small national idiosyncrasies. Financial markets are 
much more integrated than the markets for goods and services so that an observer at the centre 
does not need to have detailed local knowledge. Some national idiosyncrasies persist in 
financial markets at the retail level, but the movement towards a unified market is stronger for 
financial services than for goods and most other services.  
By contrast, the markets for most goods and services retain some distinctive national 
characteristics. For example, the average area-wide inflation rate might be influenced by a 
change in indirect taxes or a re-basing in one member country, which can at times produce an 
effect that might not even be known outside the country and whose importance is difficult to 
judge unless one knows the local situation in some detail.  
This view implies that there might well be a natural division of labour between the NCB 
presidents and the Executive Board members: the latter can contribute their knowledge about 
the state of financial markets whereas the former can contribute local knowledge about the 
real economy, including prospects for output and employment. This division of labour has 
one immediate consequence: financial markets move much more quickly than the markets for 
goods and services, which in the final analysis determine output and employment. Interest 
rates and stock markets can collapse or soar in a matter of weeks, if not days, but a fall in 
consumer demand usually takes months to develop (and to be recognised as such). Supply-
side shocks, such as an acceleration of productivity, take place over an even longer time 
horizon. 
The different comparative advantages of NCB presidents and members of the Executive 
Board suggest a simple approach to the reform of the ECB in view of enlargement. As the 
number of euro-area member countries increases, the Governing Council, which would 
continue to comprise all the NCB presidents, would meet less often and concentrate on 
strategic decisions. To be concrete, the Governing Council might meet only once every 
quarter. These meetings could involve a longer exchange of views on the state of the 
economy, which would then allow the Governing Council to formulate general, strategic 
guidelines for monetary policy, leaving the day-to-day execution to the Board in Frankfurt.   D ANIEL GROS 
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This approach has the advantage that it maintains the representation of all member countries 
in the highest decision-making body of the ECB. There is a strong political demand for full 
representation, which should not be dismissed. It also has a rational background: as argued 
above, local information is essential to fully understand the economic situation even at the 
area-wide level. This same perception is also shared by the wider public. Tough decisions by 
the ECB are thus more likely to be accepted as necessary and legitimate if all countries are 
represented in the governing body of the ECB that takes strategic decisions. In this context, 
strategic means those decisions that have a longer-run and more profound impact on the 
economy.  
During normal times the general public is unlikely to even notice the week-to-week, or even 
month-to-month changes in monetary policy interest rates. Monetary policy becomes an issue 
only when tough decisions have to be taken. This is most likely to happen when output falls 
and unemployment goes up but inflation remains high (as at present). In such a situation, the 
choice takes on great political importance. Should monetary policy become accommodating 
to sustain employment or become restrictive to achieve price stability? These are the issues 
that concern the general public rather then the question whether the appropriate neutral stance 
implies an interest rate half a percentage point higher, or whether rates should be cut in one 
month hence instead of today. This type of decision can be left to a smaller group even if it is 
not perceived to be currently representative of all countries. 
All rotational schemes face the same dilemma: while they may be fair on average, this fact is 
irrelevant at any given moment in time. If a country that is hit by a crisis does not have a 
representative on the ECB Governing Council, the public is unlikely to magnanimously 
accept its bad luck. Unpopular decisions of the ECB could then quickly be perceived as 
illegitimate because the ECB “does not even know what our problems are”. An asymmetric 
rotational scheme that differentiates, for example, between larger and smaller countries would 
reduce the likelihood that this would happen for a large country, but it would raise the general 
suspicion that ECB policy is being determined by the interest of the restricted group of 
countries that happens to be represented at any one time in the Governing Council.  
The example of the US Federal Reserve Board, where there is an asymmetry in the sense that 
the Governor of the NY Federal Reserve District is the only one to have a permanent seat in 
the Open Market Committee, does not constitute a counter argument. This asymmetry is due 
to the importance of New York as a financial centre, not because the New York District is in a 
different league in terms of population or GDP. This implies also that the NY Fed Governor is 
more likely to represent the interests of the US financial sector (witness the rescue of LTCM) 
rather than the interests of the Federal Reserve District of New York, which encompasses a 
number of quite different states. In the case of the ECB, the Board, based in Frankfurt, would 
subsume the role of the NY Fed Governor. Moreover, Governors of Federal Reserve Districts 
do not have the same prominent role in regional politics as do the presidents of NCBs in 
Europe, partially because their constituencies encompass several states (some Federal District 
boundaries even cut across states). 
The example of the US also does not justify the inclusion of the total aggregate balance sheet 
of monetary financial institutions in the indicator of size that should be used, according to the 
ECB proposal, to classify countries in different categories. The importance of a financial 
centre is not determined by the size of balance sheets but by the complexity of operations that 
are undertaken. The huge amounts of savings deposits in Luxembourg banks on their own do 
not constitute a reason to put this country in a different category. Most of these deposits come 
from other member countries and are often controlled directly or indirectly by other EU  R EFORMING THE COMPOSITION OF THE ECB GOVERNING COUNCIL 
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financial institutions. Luxembourg cannot be compared to New York; it is not the financial 
centre of the euro area. 
4. Concluding  remarks 
The main theme of this contribution has been that the official proposal to reform the 
composition of the Governing Council is so flawed that the status quo would be preferable. It 
does not make much difference whether 21 or 25 (or 30) have the right to vote when 
everybody continues to participate in the discussion anyway. The negligible gain in efficiency 
cannot compensate for the cost that must be paid as a result of the fact that the ECB’s 
proposal undermines the principle of equality among member states, thus making it more 
probable that governors of national central banks will actually put the perceived interests of 
their home country before the interests of the euro area as a whole. To undermine the 
principle of equality of member states would have been justified only if the size of the 
Governing Council had been reduced to a manageable level (e.g. around 10 members), 
thereby ensuring an important gain in efficiency.  
This contribution has also presented an alternative to the ECB proposal. The main argument, 
however, is not that this particular alternative proposal (to maintain the composition of the 
Governing Council but to confine its purview to setting the guidelines for monetary policy, 
thereby leaving their execution to the six-member Executive Board) is much better than the 
ECB proposal. The main point is that almost anything (including the status quo) would be 
better than the official proposal that is now in the process of being ratified at the national 
level. 